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Abstract 
This study constructs a simple dynamic optimization model of a central bank and 
examines its optimal behavior after exiting quantitative easing using interest-bearing 
liabilities instead of selling assets and rapidly shrinking its balance sheet. With high 
interest payments on liabilities, the bank may be forced to expand the monetary base to 
maintain its solvency, which leads to higher inflation. The model shows when the bank 
faces such a situation and derives the optimal paths of the monetary base supply and 
liabilities to deal with this. The study applies the model to the Bank of Japan and examines 
how the bank can exit quantitative easing. 
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1. Introduction 
This study constructs a simple dynamic optimization model of a central bank and 
examines its optimal behavior after exiting quantitative easing using interest-bearing 
liabilities instead of selling assets and rapidly shrinking its balance sheet. With high 
interest payments, the bank may be forced to expand the monetary base to maintain its 
solvency. The model shows when the bank faces such a situation and how it can optimally 
deal with this. 
 Many central banks in industrialized countries introduced the unconventional 
monetary easing policy after the Lehman shock, and one of the main measures of the 
policy is quantitative easing, whereby a central bank purchases a substantial amount of 
assets to supply reserves, and thus expands its balance sheet. When the economy recovers, 
the bank must exit quantitative easing. It must absorb the piled up reserves to avoid 
inflation. 
 One of the exit strategies to do so is to shrink the balance sheet rapidly by selling 
assets. However, this strategy is not feasible because interest rates rise and asset prices 
fall at and after the exit, which imposes a large capital loss on the bank. If it waits for 
asset redemption, the bank can avoid the capital loss, but the balance sheet shrinks only 
slowly. Thus, a feasible exit strategy is to absorb a large part of the reserves with other 
liabilities such as using reverse repos or paying high interest on the excessive part of 
reserves while waiting for asset redemption, as suggested by Bernanke (2009). Such an 
exit strategy can absorb a large amount of reserves without rapidly shrinking the balance 
sheet, but it imposes high interest payments on the bank. 
 The heavy interest burden deteriorates the central bank’s financial health. An 
unsound central bank may cause a large expansion of the monetary base and thus high 
inflation, as some developing countries have experienced. 
 The financial health of the central bank, especially the role of its capital, have 
been examined and among the early literature are Leone (1994), Stella (1997), Ueda 
(2003), Dalton and Diziobek (2005), Ize (2005), and Milton and Sinclair (2011)1. The 
influence of the financial health on monetary policy is discussed by Stella (1997). 
 
1 See Hall and Reis (2015), Appendix A for an extensive survey of the literature in this 
field. 
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Empirical evidence of a negative relationship between central bank financial health and 
monetary policy performance is presented by Klüh and Stella (2008) and Adler et al. 
(2012). 
 A large loss deteriorates a central bank’s financial health. The bank can restore 
its solvency by receiving fiscal support from the government. However, if this option is 
not available, the bank has no choice but to expand the monetary base to maintain 
solvency. By introducing a central bank’s intertemporal budget constraint, Hall and Reis 
(2015) theoretically examine when the bank becomes insolvent, and Del Negro and Sims 
(2015) present the simulation result regarding the Fed’s solvency when it follows the 
Taylor rule after an exit from quantitative easing. Berriel and Bhattarai (2009) and Berriel 
and Mendes (2015) examine a central bank’s behavior to avoid insolvency. The former 
study uses a model that includes the bank’s capital as well as inflation and output in its 
objective function, and the latter presents a simulation of a central bank’s behavior by 
setting a lower bound for its capital. Benigno and Nisticò (2015) investigate how a central 
bank can restore solvency; they show the condition to restore solvency and present some 
numerical examples of time paths of a central bank’s capital, monetary base supply, and 
other variables. 
 This study explicitly examines a dynamic optimizing behavior of a central bank 
and derives optimal time paths of its monetary base supply and other variables when it 
bears high interest payments for exiting quantitative easing. The study focuses on the case 
of no fiscal support from the government2, since a central bank does not generally become 
insolvent with fiscal support so long as the government remains solvent3. 
 Such an optimal behavior is theoretically examined by Tanaka (2019). However, 
its model examines the bank’s net assets instead of handling the assets and liabilities 
separately. As Bhattarai et al. (2015) and Berriel and Mendes (2015) demonstrate, it is 
important for a central bank to have less liquid assets in quantitative easing. This study 
 
2 The Bank of Japan Act does not provide any rule regarding the government’s fiscal 
support, and, as highlighted by Reis (2015, p.3), the fiscal support for the Federal 
Reserves and the European Central Bank is not clear. 
3 Previous literature such as Reis (2015), Hall and Reis (2015), Benigno and Nisticò 
(2015), and Berentsen et al. (2016) compare several rules of fund transfers to and from 
the government. 
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assumes that the assets purchased by a central bank before an exit from quantitative easing 
are much less liquid than the liabilities. The assets bear only low returns, and the bank 
cannot sell them but can only shrink their volume slowly, while the liabilities used to 
absorb excessive funds at the exit impose high interest payments on the bank. This 
situation may make the bank insolvent, and the model in the current study reveals the 
bank’s optimal paths of the liabilities and the monetary base to restore solvency. 
 This rest of this paper is organized as follows. Before considering the case in 
which a central bank shrinks its balance sheet, section 2 examines a simple case in which 
the balance sheet is constant. The model is constructed, and a central bank’s optimal 
behavior is derived and graphically illustrated. Section 3 modifies the model so that the 
balance sheet slowly shrinks through redemption. The bank’s optimal behavior is derived, 
and it is applied to the case of the Bank of Japan. 
 
2. Model with the Balance Sheet Constant 
2.1. Model Setting 
This section considers the case in which a central bank does not shrink its balance sheet 
after an exit from quantitative easing. In Table 1, it is shown that before an exit from 
quantitative easing, a central bank has built up the asset holdings A to supply a substantial 
amount of monetary base H. The assets bear only a low interest rate 𝑟𝐴 since they are 
purchased during quantitative easing. At the exit, the bank absorbs a large amount of the 
monetary base via some liabilities L. The liabilities can be the those obtained by any fund-
absorbing operation such as reverse repos or the special reserves paying interests. In either 
case, the central bank needs to pay a high interest rate 𝑟𝐿, which is higher than 𝑟𝐴, on the 
liabilities so that the private banks have an incentive to switch some funds from H to L 
instead of using them for credit creation4. 
 
Insert Table 1 around here. 
 
 
4 In this model, L can be negative. In some cases, as shown later, L is positive at the exit, 
but the central bank chooses to reduce L gradually to make it negative. This means that 
the bank stops fund-absorbing operation, and that it starts purchasing new assets that bear 
𝑟𝐿. 
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 The model in this study starts at the exit, 𝑡 = 0 . At 𝑡 = 0, ⋯ , ∞ , the central 
bank controls H and thus changes L, while A is assumed to be constant in this section. 
The central bank’s profit π is defined as 
π = 𝑟𝐴𝐴 − 𝑟𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶, (1) 
where C is the bank’s operating cost, which is exogenous and assumed to be constant. In 
this study, the bank has no transfer to and from the government5. Changes in balance sheet 
variables satisfy, 
?̇? = −?̇? − ?̇? = −?̇? − 𝑟𝐴𝐴 + 𝑟𝐿𝐿 + 𝐶, (2) 
where ?̇? = 𝑑𝐿 𝑑𝑡⁄ , ?̇? = 𝑑𝐻 𝑑𝑡⁄ , ?̇? = 𝑑𝐾 𝑑𝑡⁄ = π. 
 The central bank’s objective is to stabilize the inflation. The price level is 
determined by the following simple equation 
𝑃 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐻 + 𝛼2𝜂, (3) 
where P is the price level, η is a vector of variables affecting P. The inflation ?̇? =
𝑑𝑃 𝑑𝑡⁄  is, 
?̇? = 𝛼1?̇? + 𝛼2?̇?, (4) 
where ?̇? = 𝑑𝜂 𝑑𝑡⁄ . Since the current study focuses on the central bank’s behavior and its 
influence on inflation, any change in η  is not considered here for simplicity, and 
therefore, 
?̇? = 𝛼1?̇?. (4′) 
The central bank exits quantitative easing at 𝑡 = 0, and it attempts to make the inflation 
?̇? near the target ?̇?∗ by controlling ?̇? at 𝑡 = 0, ⋯ , ∞ . It minimizes the following 
quadratic loss function; 
min
?̇?
∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛿𝑡) {
1
2
(?̇? − ?̇?∗)
2
}
∞
0
𝑑𝑡, (5) 
where δ is a discount factor, δ < 𝑟𝐿. Putting equations (2), (4’), and (5) together we 
have, 
min
?̇?
∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛿𝑡) {
1
2
(𝛼1?̇? − 𝛼1?̇?
∗)
2
} 𝑑𝑡 
∞
0
(5′) 
 
5 Many central banks have the rule to make remittance to the government when the profit 
is positive. Such remittance can be easily introduced into the model in this study, but it 
does not make any crucial change in the result; the remittance is therefore omitted for 
simplicity. 
6 
 
s. t. ?̇? = −?̇? − 𝑟𝐴𝐴 + 𝑟𝐿𝐿 + 𝐶, (2) 
𝐿 = 𝐿0 at 𝑡 = 0. (6) 
where ?̇?∗ is the target increase in the monetary base that is consistent with the inflation 
target ?̇?∗, ?̇?∗ = ?̇?∗ 𝛼1⁄ . Equation (6) is the initial condition where 𝐿0 is the amount of 
funds that the central bank must absorb to end quantitative easing. Given δ, rA, rL, A, C, 
?̇?∗, and 𝐿0, the central bank sets ?̇? for all 𝑡 ≥ 0. ?̇? is a control variable, and L is a 
state variable. 
 
2.2. Optimal Behavior 
The current value Hamiltonian ℋ is 
ℋ =
1
2
(𝛼1?̇? − 𝛼1?̇?
∗)
2
+ 𝑚(−?̇? − 𝑟𝐴𝐴 + 𝑟𝐿𝐿 + 𝐶), (7) 
where m is the current value multiplier. The first-order conditions are as follows. 
𝜕ℋ 𝜕?̇?⁄ = 𝛼1
2(?̇? − ?̇?∗) − 𝑚 = 0, (8 − 1) 
?̇? = 𝛿𝑚 − 𝜕ℋ 𝜕𝐿 =⁄ (𝛿 − 𝑟𝐿)𝑚, (8 − 2) 
where ?̇? = 𝑑𝑚 𝑑𝑡⁄  . Equations (8-1), (8-2), and (2) reduce to the next differential 
equations 
?̇? = 𝑟𝐿𝐿 − ?̇? − 𝑟𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶, (9 − 1) 
?̈? = (𝛿 − 𝑟)(?̇? − ?̇?∗), (9 − 2) 
where ?̈? = 𝑑2𝐻 𝑑𝑡2⁄ . A steady state (?̇?𝑆, 𝐿𝑆) is 
?̇?𝑆 = ?̇?
∗, 𝐿𝑆 =
?̇?∗ + 𝑟𝐴𝐴 − 𝐶
𝑟𝐿
. (10 − 1) 
The steady state of inflation is 
?̇?𝑆 = ?̇?
∗ = 𝛼1?̇?
∗. (10 − 2) 
 Figure 1 illustrates a phase diagram of the variables ?̇?  and L. The ?̇? = 0  
locus is derived from equation (9-1) and its slope is 1 𝑟𝐿⁄ . L is increasing in the area to 
the left of the ?̇? = 0 and is decreasing in the area to its right. The ?̈? = 0 locus is 
derived from equation (9-2) and it is vertical at ?̇?∗. ?̇? is decreasing if ?̇? > ?̇?∗ and is 
increasing if ?̇? < ?̇?∗ since δ < 𝑟𝐿 . The steady state (?̇?𝑆, 𝐿𝑆) is a saddle point. As 
discussed by Reis (2015), a central bank needs to satisfy the following no-Ponzi game 
condition  
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lim
𝑡→∞
𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑟𝐿𝑡)𝐿 ≤ 0, (11) 
to stay solvent. 
 
Insert Figure 1 around here. 
 
 From equations (9-1) and (9-2), a second-order differential equation of L is 
derived 
?̈? − 𝛿?̇? + 𝑟𝐿(𝛿 − 𝑟𝐿)𝐿 = (𝛿 − 𝑟𝐿)(𝐶 − 𝑟𝐴𝐴 − ?̇?
∗), (12) 
where ?̈? = 𝑑2𝐿 𝑑𝑡2⁄ . Solving differential equation (12) derives the optimal paths of L. 
𝐿 = 𝑘1𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑟𝐿𝑡) + 𝑘2𝑒𝑥𝑝{(𝛿 − 𝑟𝐿)𝑡} + 𝐿𝑆. (13) 
As 1 > 𝑟𝐿 > 𝛿 > 0 is assumed, only the path with 𝑘1 = 0 can reach 𝐿𝑆. 
 With the initial condition (6), the optimal paths of L and ?̇? are derived as 
follows: 
𝐿 = (𝐿0 − 𝐿𝑆)𝑒𝑥𝑝{(𝛿 − 𝑟𝐿)𝑡} + 𝐿𝑆, (14 − 1) 
?̇? = (2𝑟𝐿 − 𝛿)(𝐿0 − 𝐿𝑆)𝑒𝑥𝑝{(𝛿 − 𝑟𝐿)𝑡} + ?̇?
∗. (14 − 2) 
The resulting inflation path is derived by substituting (14-2) into (4’). The convergence 
locus shown by equations (14-1) and (14-2) is illustrated in Figure 1. Its slope is 
1 (2𝑟𝐿 − 𝛿)⁄ , which is smaller than the slope of ?̇? = 0 locus. 
 
2.3. Policy Implications 
(a) Case of 𝐿0 > 𝐿𝑆 
This subsection examines the optimal path of the monetary base. At the exit, a central 
bank holds the liabilities 𝐿0. Suppose 𝐿0 is substantially large so that 𝐿0 > 𝐿𝑆. Such 
𝐿0 is shown as 𝐿0
1  in Figure 1. The bank can choose any value of ?̇? on the horizontal 
dotted line at 𝐿 = 𝐿0
1  . If the bank sets ?̇? = ?̇?∗ , then L starts moving upward, and 
condition (11) does not hold. To avoid an increase in L, the bank must increase ?̇? to 
reach the ?̇? = 0 locus, but it is not optimal either. The bank’s optimal behavior is to 
increase ?̇? further to the convergence locus. The no-Ponzi game condition is binding, 
and only (11), which has an equal sign, holds. It is now the transversality condition for 
the model, and the solution is shown by equations (14-1) and (14-2). The bank’s optimal 
solution only gradually moves along the convergence locus toward the steady state point 
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(?̇?𝑆, 𝐿𝑆)6. 
 In the case of 𝐿0 > 𝐿𝑆, the no-Ponzi game condition (11) is binding, and the 
central bank cannot stay solvent unless it accelerates the monetary base increases. The 
optimal increase in the monetary base is larger than the increase only to prevent any 
expansion in L; it should be large enough to shrink L. The path of the resulting inflation 
is derived from by (14-2) and (4’). It shows the bank cannot avoid considerable inflation 
after the exit, and the inflation only gradually falls toward the inflation target ?̇?∗. 
 Higher 𝑟𝐿 deteriorates the situation. It makes the convergence locus flatter as 
its slope is 1 (2𝑟𝐿 − 𝛿)⁄ , and it makes 𝐿
𝑆 smaller; both lead to larger ?̇?. 
 
(b) Case of 𝐿0 ≤ 𝐿𝑆 
Suppose the central bank need not have a large amount of liabilities, 𝐿0 ≤ 𝐿𝑆 at the exit. 
Such 𝐿0 is shown as 𝐿0
2  in Figure 1 If the bank sets ?̇? = ?̇?∗ for all 𝑡 ≥ 0, the minimal 
value of loss function (5’) is achieved. Equation (9-1) at 𝑡 = 0 is 
?̇? = 𝑟𝐿𝐿0
2 − ?̇?∗ − 𝑟𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶 ≤ 𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑆 − ?̇?
∗ − 𝑟𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶 = 0  
as equation (10-1) holds. L never increases throughout 𝑡 ≥ 0, and condition (11) is not 
binding. Therefore, in contrast to the above case (a), the bank can always set ?̇? at the 
target ?̇?∗ and thus the inflation ?̇? at the target ?̇?∗. 
 
3. Model with Shrinking the Balance Sheet Slowly 
3.1 Model Setting 
Although a central bank does not sell the assets to avoid any capital loss at and after an 
exit from quantitative easing, it can reduce the asset holdings by redemption. In this 
section, the above model is modified for a central bank to shrink the asset holdings at rate 
ρ. The rate is assumed to be given to the central bank because the redemption schedule is 
predetermined. 
 
6 When the bank reaches the steady state point, L remains unchanged, and A is constant, 
while H continues to expand by ?̇?𝑆. This is because π is negative by the same amount, 
which continuously decreases K by the same amount. Negative K is allowed since it is 
not in the no-Ponzi game condition. If positive K is preferred, the bank can easily achieve 
it by accelerating ?̇? slightly over the convergence locus. It puts the bank on a path for L 
to diverge downward. Negative L makes π and K positive sooner or later. 
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 The central bank’s balance sheet before and at the exit is the same as in Table 1. 
The asset holdings are 𝐴0 at 𝑡 = 0, and, after the exit, the bank shrinks them slowly at 
the rate ρ to zero at 𝑡 → ∞. 
𝐴 = 𝐴0𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜌𝑡). (15) 
Table 2 shows the balance sheet at 𝑡 → ∞. L can be positive or negative. Negative L 
means that the bank clears the liabilities and starts purchasing new assets that bear 𝑟𝐿7. 
 
Insert Table 2 around here. 
 
 From the balance sheet constraint and equation (1) we have 
?̇? = ?̇? − ?̇? − ?̇? = −𝜌𝐴 − ?̇? − 𝑟𝐴𝐴 + 𝑟𝐿𝐿 + 𝐶 
= 𝑟𝐿𝐿 − ?̇? − (𝜌 + 𝑟𝐴)𝐴0𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜌𝑡) + 𝐶. (16)
Thus, the model in this section is as follows. 
min
?̇?
∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜌𝑡) {
1
2
(𝛼1?̇? − 𝛼1?̇?
∗)
2
}
∞
0
𝑑𝑡 (5′) 
s. t. ?̇? = 𝑟𝐿𝐿 − ?̇? − (𝜌 + 𝑟𝐴)𝐴0𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜌𝑡) + 𝐶, (16) 
𝐿 = 𝐿0 at 𝑡 = 0. (6) 
Given δ, 𝑟𝐴, 𝑟𝐿 , 𝐴0, 𝜌, 𝐶, 𝐿0, and 𝐻
∗, the central bank sets ?̇? for all 𝑡 ≥ 0. 
 
3.2. Optimal Behavior 
The current value Hamiltonian ℋ is 
ℋ =
1
2
(𝛼1?̇? − 𝛼1?̇?
∗)
2
+ 𝑚{𝑟𝐿𝐿 − ?̇? − (𝜌 + 𝑟𝐴)𝐴0𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜌𝑡) + 𝐶}, (17) 
where m is the current value multiplier. The first-order conditions are as follows. 
𝜕ℋ 𝜕?̇?⁄ = 𝛼1
2(?̇? − ?̇?∗) − 𝑚 = 0, (18 − 1) 
?̇? = 𝛿𝑚 − 𝜕ℋ 𝜕𝐿 =⁄ (𝛿 − 𝑟𝐿)𝑚. (18 − 2) 
Equations (18-1), (18-2), and (16) reduce to the next differential equations 
?̇? = 𝑟𝐿𝐿 − ?̇? − (𝜌 + 𝑟𝐴)𝐴0𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜌𝑡) + 𝐶, (19 − 1) 
?̈? = (𝛿 − 𝑟)(?̇? − ?̇?∗). (19 − 2) 
 
7 It is more realistic for a central bank to take a path of L to diverge negatively. See 
footnote 6. 
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 From these equations, a second-order differential equation of L is derived; 
?̈? − 𝛿?̇? + 𝑟𝐿(𝛿 − 𝑟𝐿)𝐿 = (𝜌 + 𝑟𝐴)(𝛿 − 𝑟𝐿 + 𝜌)𝐴0𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜌𝑡) + (𝛿 − 𝑟𝐿)(?̇?
∗ − 𝐶). (20) 
Solving the differential equation (20) derives the optimal path of L. 
𝐿 = (𝐿0 − 𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑒𝑥𝑝{(𝛿 − 𝑟𝐿)𝑡} + β𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜌𝑡) + 𝛾, (21 − 1) 
where β =
𝜌 + 𝑟𝐴
𝜌 + 𝑟𝐿
𝐴0, 𝛾 =
?̇?∗ − 𝐶
𝑟𝐿
. (22) 
From equations (21-1) and (16), the optimal path of ?̇? is 
?̇? = (2𝑟𝐿 − 𝛿)(𝐿0 − 𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑒𝑥𝑝{(𝛿 − 𝑟𝐿)𝑡} + ?̇?
∗. (21 − 2) 
 
3.3. Policy Implications 
(a) Cases of 𝐿0 > 𝛽 + 𝛾 and 𝐿0 ≤ 𝛽 + 𝛾 
To see when the no-Ponzi game condition (11) is satisfied in this model, multiply both 
sides of equation (16) by 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑟𝐿𝑡) and sum them from 𝑡 = 0 to ∞ to obtain 
∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑟𝐿𝑡)(?̇? − 𝑟𝐿𝐿)
∞
0
𝑑𝑡
= − ∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑟𝐿𝑡)?̇?𝑑𝑡
∞
0
− ∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝[−(𝜌 + 𝑟𝐿)𝑡](𝜌 + 𝑟𝐴)𝐴0𝑑𝑡 + ∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑟𝐿𝑡)𝐶𝑑𝑡
∞
0
∞
0
. 
This becomes the following equation. 
lim
𝑡→∞
𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑟𝐿𝑡) 𝐿 = 𝐿0 − 𝛽 − 𝛾 − ∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑟𝐿𝑡)(?̇? − ?̇?
∗)𝑑𝑡
∞
0
. 
If 𝐿0 ≤ 𝛽 + 𝛾, then the central bank achieves the target ?̇? = ?̇?
∗ for all t. Condition (11) 
is always satisfied, and is therefore not binding. If 𝐿0 > 𝛽 + 𝛾, the bank must make ?̇? 
larger than the target ?̇?∗ to satisfy the no-Ponzi game condition. It is binding and the 
bank must follow the optimal paths (21-1) and (21-2) to stay solvent. The bank must 
accelerate the monetary base increase, causing inflation that is higher than the target ?̇? >
?̇?∗. 
 A change in 𝑟𝐿, ρ, or ?̇?
∗ has the following effects on the central bank. 
𝜕(𝛽 + 𝛾) 𝜕𝑟𝐿 < 0⁄ , 𝜕(𝛽 + 𝛾) 𝜕𝜌⁄ > 0, 𝜕(𝛽 + 𝛾) 𝜕?̇?
∗ > 0⁄ , 
𝜕?̇? 𝜕𝑟𝐿 ⋛ 0⁄ , 𝜕?̇? 𝜕𝜌⁄ < 0, 𝜕?̇? 𝜕?̇?
∗ > 0⁄ . 
An increase in 𝑟𝐿, a decrease in ρ, or a decrease in ?̇?
∗ pushes the bank toward 𝐿0 >
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𝛽 + 𝛾. The sign of 𝜕?̇? 𝜕𝑟𝐿⁄  depends on t; it is positive at 𝑡 = 0, but it later turns to 
negative. With higher 𝑟𝐿, the bank shrinks more L immediately after the exit to avoid the 
heavy interest burden, which forces the bank to accelerate the monetary base increase ?̇? 
early rather than later. Higher ρ allows the bank to make the monetary base increase 
slower. 
 
(b) Case of the Bank of Japan 
The model in this section is applied to the case of the Bank of Japan (BOJ). The BOJ has 
been expanding its balance sheet for quantitative easing. Suppose the bank exits the 
quantitative easing in April 2019 and we investigate how the bank can manage the 
situation. 
 The upper part of Table 3 shows the figures at 𝑡 = 0. In March 2019, which is 
the end of fiscal year 2018, the BOJ has 511 trillion yen of assets and 502 trillion yen of 
monetary base. Since the cash and required reserves amount to 118 trillion yen, it is 
assumed that the BOJ absorbs 502-118=384 trillion yen with some interest-bearing 
liabilities at the exit in April. The figures 𝑟𝐴 = 0.43% and 𝐶 = 0.198 trillion yen are 
from the fiscal year 2018, and δ is assumed to be lower than 𝑟𝐿 by 1%. 
 
Insert Table 3 around here. 
 
 The lower part of Table 3 presents some simulations. In case (1), it is assumed 
that 𝑟𝐿 is 2.5%
8, and that the BOJ targets 0% inflation, ?̇?∗ = 𝛼1?̇?
∗ = 0. The majority 
of the assets held by the BOJ are Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs), and the average 
maturity of those held by the bank is between 7 and 8 years. In case (1), the BOJ stops 
purchasing the JGBs and the asset holdings are assumed to decrease at ρ = 1 7⁄ =
14.3% due to the redemption. Then, 𝐿0 − 𝛽 − 𝛾 = −55.97 < 0, and the no-Ponzi game 
condition (11) is therefore not binding; the BOJ can hit the target ?̇?∗ = 𝛼1?̇?
∗ = 0. Case 
(2) shows if 𝑟𝐿 rises to 5.1%, 𝐿0 − 𝛽 − 𝛾 becomes positive, and the BOJ starts having 
 
8 Iwata and the Japan Center for Economic Research (2014) assume the interest rate on 
a part of the excess reserves after exiting quantitative easing in Japan to be 2.5% or 
3.0% in its simulation. In their simulation, Fujiki and Tomura (2017) assume the short-
term interest rate to be 2.75% in the long run. 
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difficulty in hitting the target. 
 It may not be appropriate to assume that the BOJ stops purchasing the JGBs 
completely at and after the exit. In fiscal year 2018, the government issued 47 trillion yen 
of JGBs, excluding refunding bonds, and the BOJ’s holdings of JGBs increased by 22 
trillion yen. At the end of fiscal year 2018, the total outstanding of JGBs is 977 trillion 
yen, 470 trillion yen of which is held by the BOJ. In such a situation, reducing the BOJ’s 
holdings by 477 7⁄ = 67 trillion yen per year may lead to JGB market turmoil. 
 As the extreme case opposite to no purchase, suppose the BOJ purchases some 
JGBs to keep the asset holdings constant as is assumed in section 2. Case (3) in Table 3 
shows that 𝐿0 − 𝛽 − 𝛾 is positive, and that the monetary base should expand by 10.63 
trillion yen at 𝑡 = 0, which corresponds to a ?̇?0 𝐻0⁄ = 10.63/118 = 9.03% increase. 
If the BOJ targets a 2% × 𝐻0 = 2.35 trillion yen increase, then case (4) shows that the 
monetary base should expand by 7.34 trillion yen, which corresponds to a 6.23% increase. 
Thus, the BOJ’s success in exiting quantitative easing in April 2019 crucially depends on 
the fiscal deficit and JGB market condition. The more JGBs the BOJ must purchase for 
market stability, the more likely the bank has no option but to accelerate the monetary 
base increase and thus inflation. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This study examined a central bank’s optimal behavior after an exit from quantitative 
easing when the bank cannot shrink its balance sheet rapidly. It constructed a dynamic 
optimization model of a central bank and derived the optimal paths of its monetary base 
supply and liabilities. The study investigated the model with the balance sheet constant 
and then modified the model to allow the balance sheet to shrink slowly. The analysis 
reveals the followings findings. 
 The condition for a central bank to face the solvency problem depends on various 
variables including the interest rates, the rate of asset redemption, asset holdings, the size 
of funds to be absorbed at an exit, the targets of monetary base increase and inflation, and 
the bank’s operating cost. 
 When it does not face the solvency problem, a central bank can always hit the 
targets of monetary base increase and inflation. When it does, the bank is forced to 
13 
 
accelerate the monetary base increase, which should be large enough to shrink the 
liabilities used for exiting quantitative easing, and thus to cause higher inflation. The 
situation deteriorates with higher interest on the liabilities or slower asset redemption. 
 The model is applied to the BOJ. If the BOJ exits quantitative easing in April 
2019, then the success of the exit crucially depends on the fiscal deficit and Japanese 
Government Bond market condition. If it is allowed to stop the JGB purchase completely, 
the BOJ does not face the solvency problem. However, if it needs to purchase some JGBs 
to slow the decrease in JGB holdings, the bank has no option but to accelerate the 
monetary base increase substantially, which leads to higher inflation. 
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Table 1. Central Bank’s Balance Sheet Before and At the Exit 
 Before the exit, 𝑡 < 0    At the exit, 𝑡 = 0  
 Assets (A) Monetary 
Base (H) 
 
 
   Assets (A) Monetary 
Base (H) 
 
   Liabilities (L)  
 Capital (K)    Capital (K)  
         
 
Table 2. Central Bank’s Balance Sheet After the Exit 
 After the exit, 𝑡 → ∞  
 New 
Assets (-L) 
Monetary 
Base (H) 
 
 Capital (K)  
    
 
Table 3. Some Simulations of the Bank of Japan’s Exit 
 At the exit, 𝑡 = 0  
 𝐴0 = 511
a 𝐻0 = 118  
 𝐿0 = 384  
 𝐾0 = 9  
    
𝑟𝐴 = 0.43%
b, 𝐶 = 0.198, δ = 𝑟𝐿 − 1% 
Case 𝑟𝐿 ?̇?
∗ ρ 𝐿0 − 𝛽 − 𝛾 ?̇?0 
(1) 2.5% 0  14.3% -55.97 0.00 
(2) 5.1% 0  14.3% 0.03 0.00 
(3) 2.5% 0  0.0% 303.74 10.63 
(4) 2.5% 2.35  0.0% 209.61 7.34 
 Notes:  Trillion yen unless otherwise stated. 
  a 𝐴0 is equal to the total assets minus the liabilities 
    other than 𝐻0 and 𝐿0. 
  b 𝑟𝐴 is equal to the sum of the BOJ’s profit and C divided by 𝐴0. 
 Source: The BOJ’s figures are from its Financial Statement and Annual Review. 
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Figure 1. Phase Diagram of ?̇? and L 
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